Its well known that the French investigation is focused on avoiding any allocation of blame. With all the inter-linkages between Airbus, Air France and the French government it is clear that the BEA is actually investigating the French government. The level of disclosure tolerated by the French is abysmally low in comparison to what the NTSB would be revealing.
The above paragraph from an earlier posting on this blog is being repeated in response to some inquiries I've had regarding the recent publication of more complete transcripts in a book that focuses clearly on pilot error and pilot standards.
The French view is that only pertinent conversations get published. The American view is that everything, including the final expletives, get published. It is a question of openness and a dedication to seeing that absolutely nothing is to prevent the deaths that have taken place from being deaths that contribute to future air safety.
There are serious issues as to whether the initial climb was the result of pilot commanded inputs or not. The book fails to address this issue. The fact that irrelevant conversations were taking place is meaningless. The plane was not at an altitude where rules impose a "sterile cockpit" devoid of non-pertinent conversations or activities.
The pilots were suddenly confronted with a situation where the computer suddenly said "your plane". As young pilots with an instructor beside them they've heard that phrase a zillion times but suddenly they are "hearing" it without warning and they are no longer in some small two-seated training aircraft. The computer gave up when limits were exceeded and dumped them into alternate law amidst a flurry of warning messages and loss of instruments coupled with loss of any sense that remaining instruments were or even might be reliable. Its pure hell when a complex system cuts out.
Other, non fatal, incidents indicate a serious likelihood that that initial climb of a few thousand feet was not selected by pilot initiated control inputs. After that the cascade of events proceeds with confusion and unreliable information. The start of the fatal event was that initial climb. Blame the pilots for it? Not yet!!!
Showing posts with label Pilot Error. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pilot Error. Show all posts
Friday, October 14, 2011
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Enough on those SpanAir Trojan headlines!!
When will it ever stop? All these misleading headlines and in many cases totally misleading stories.
The SpanAir crash at Madrid was not in any way caused by a computer that had trojan horse software on it. The computer at the airlines headquarters which managed repair scheduling was later found to be laden with trojan malware. Its not a computer that was onboard the aircraft or had anything to do with the operation of the flight.
SpanAir flight from Madrid to Las Palmas in late August of 2008 crashed on takeoff because the crew failed to set the slats for takeoff, an absolutely critical procedure that was called out in the checklist but not actually performed. The automatic warning systems concerning the flaps and slats settings failed to sound an alarm because they are not supposed to sound when the plane is flying at high altitude. The alarm systems that did sound prior to the takeoff dealt with a pressure sensing system that is only supposed to sound at high altitude.
Physically that plane was on the ground. Electronically that plane "thought" it was already at high altitude. The pilots were not mentally there at all, but the plane did not crash because of any memory-choking malware on a maintenance-scheduling computer at SpanAir's headquarters! Why can't editors and re-write men get that straight?
On-Edit: Please note that the above rant about unprofessional journalism standards relates to the mis-reporting of the malware infected computer at SpanAir's headquarters as having had some effect on the crash.
For those interested in the crash:
It was, as they all are, pilot error. Errors that would be absurd for even a student pilot to have made.
The crew appear to have misinterpreted the stall warning as a fire warning. Well, each is serious perhaps but a stall warning is a well known sound and the remotest possibility of a stall takes precedence over any other sort of sensory input. The misinterpretation robbed the crew of a few moments of recovery time. Well, they had precious few moments to begin with and would have been unlikely to have recovered anyway. One would not expect such a lackadaisical crew to have performed a low level stall recovery correctly.
The crew failed to realize that if an alarm had been sounding an hour previously that only sounds when the plane is at high altitude then that meant they were on notice inquiry to investigate the "weight on nosewheel" switch. Yes, switch, not relay! Its the switch that is most likely to fail. Its the switch that is relatively exposed to the elements and debris accumulation. Just because the plane was obviously on the ground does not mean the various avionics systems knew that!
With a failed "weight on nosewheel" switch, the utterly critical alarm for "Idiotic Pilots Trying To Take-Off Without Slats" is automatically disabled. So there was no alarm for the one absolutely critical take-off setting on that plane! The lack of an electronic alarm however had absolutely nothing to do with the crew's failure to properly set the slats and properly check the slat setting in accordance with the checklist procedures.
The SpanAir crash at Madrid was not in any way caused by a computer that had trojan horse software on it. The computer at the airlines headquarters which managed repair scheduling was later found to be laden with trojan malware. Its not a computer that was onboard the aircraft or had anything to do with the operation of the flight.
SpanAir flight from Madrid to Las Palmas in late August of 2008 crashed on takeoff because the crew failed to set the slats for takeoff, an absolutely critical procedure that was called out in the checklist but not actually performed. The automatic warning systems concerning the flaps and slats settings failed to sound an alarm because they are not supposed to sound when the plane is flying at high altitude. The alarm systems that did sound prior to the takeoff dealt with a pressure sensing system that is only supposed to sound at high altitude.
Physically that plane was on the ground. Electronically that plane "thought" it was already at high altitude. The pilots were not mentally there at all, but the plane did not crash because of any memory-choking malware on a maintenance-scheduling computer at SpanAir's headquarters! Why can't editors and re-write men get that straight?
On-Edit: Please note that the above rant about unprofessional journalism standards relates to the mis-reporting of the malware infected computer at SpanAir's headquarters as having had some effect on the crash.
For those interested in the crash:
It was, as they all are, pilot error. Errors that would be absurd for even a student pilot to have made.
The crew appear to have misinterpreted the stall warning as a fire warning. Well, each is serious perhaps but a stall warning is a well known sound and the remotest possibility of a stall takes precedence over any other sort of sensory input. The misinterpretation robbed the crew of a few moments of recovery time. Well, they had precious few moments to begin with and would have been unlikely to have recovered anyway. One would not expect such a lackadaisical crew to have performed a low level stall recovery correctly.
The crew failed to realize that if an alarm had been sounding an hour previously that only sounds when the plane is at high altitude then that meant they were on notice inquiry to investigate the "weight on nosewheel" switch. Yes, switch, not relay! Its the switch that is most likely to fail. Its the switch that is relatively exposed to the elements and debris accumulation. Just because the plane was obviously on the ground does not mean the various avionics systems knew that!
With a failed "weight on nosewheel" switch, the utterly critical alarm for "Idiotic Pilots Trying To Take-Off Without Slats" is automatically disabled. So there was no alarm for the one absolutely critical take-off setting on that plane! The lack of an electronic alarm however had absolutely nothing to do with the crew's failure to properly set the slats and properly check the slat setting in accordance with the checklist procedures.
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